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FROM THE EDITOR
A legacy worth leaving
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deserves the congratulations flowing in from foreign leaders, domestic rivals, and news commentators 
for his decisive first-round reelection victory. At nearly 
every turn over the last three months, Yudhoyono 
outperformed his rivals. 
Despite a few notable flaps by loose-lipped aides 
and a tendency to be goaded into petty spats, the 
campaign showed a remarkable degree of discipline, 
sophistication, and responsiveness. In the debates, 
Yudhoyono often came off as dull and a bit aloof. 
But while his performances did not exactly make for 
scintillating entertainment, his willingness to speak in 
concrete terms about solving issues facing the country 
compared favourably to the glibness of Jusuf Kalla, and 
the outright ignorance of Megawati Sukarnoputri. 
More than the lack of a confidence-inspiring 
challenger, however, Yudhoyono owes his reelection to 
a host of popular policies that led voters to support his 
candidacy on the basis of their rational economic and 
political interests. Some commentators have derided 
programs such as the direct cash assistance to the poor 
and a well-publicised campaign to eliminate school 
fees as populism à la Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s 
exiled former premier. But if the school fee initiative 
is combined with real educational reform, and if the 
cash assistance helps justify further efforts to reduce 
wasteful and counterproductive subsidies for electricity 
and fuel products, then “populism” will be well worth 
its price. 
Unfortunately, early signs from the Istana about the 
direction of Yudhoyono’s second term are not terribly 
heartening. Many Indonesians hope that a second-
term Yudhoyono government, emboldened by its 
overwhelming electoral mandate, will seek to shape 
a legacy of bureaucratic reform and infrastructure 
improvements. But the president’s first post-election 
moves are more likely to assuage the fears of the 
entrenched elite than to please a new generation of 
reformers. 
How possible is government action on much-needed 
bureaucratic reform if, as Yudhoyono has said will 
once again be the case, half of the cabinet members 
are politicians loyal more to their political parties and 
private interests than to the public good? How possible 
is a successful effort to rebuild the country if top-flight 
reformers are sidelined for making waves? 
The likely departure of both Finance Minister and 
Coordinating Economic Minister Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati and Tax Directorate chief Darmin Nasution 
to Bank Indonesia does not augur well for tilting the 
balance of power in the cabinet away from the Golkar 
dinosaurs and the Islamist party representatives. 
More concerning than Sri Mulyani’s likely move to the 
bank are the rumoured reasons behind the decision. 
Yudhoyono’s notorious concern with his image may 
have driven him to reassign Sri Mulyani, rather than run 
the risk of her stealing the show. Next to Sri Mulyani 
and her outspoken, hard-driving style, Yudhoyono 
may have feared looking like only a reluctant reformer 
forced by his staff to kerb cronyism in his cabinet. 
The effort to clean up the bureaucracy, however, needs 
that hard-driving type of reform. Sri Mulyani will no 
doubt excel at the bank just as she has excelled at the 
Ministry of Finance, but her move to the bank is a 
signal that there are limits to how hard reformers will 
be allowed to push. 
Most concerning of all are signs that the president 
is content to see the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) cowed until it’s politically pliant. 
The Commission is the country’s most credible public 
institution, but rather than laud it for taking on 
entrenched political interests, the president has stood 
by as rapacious lawmakers and officials try to strip it 
of vital investigatory powers and to allow the highly 
regarded Anti-Corruption Court to lapse. When he 
did speak, it was to issue a warning about the dangers 
of leaving the KPK’s powers unchecked. 
Yudhoyono championed the KPK before it targeted 
former Bank Indonesia Governor Aulia Pohan, the 
father of Yudhoyono’s daughter-in-law. Now, the KPK 
finds itself in a high level stand-off with the National 
Police, and Yudhoyono appears to be sympathetic to 
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the police’s apparent efforts to fight back against the 
KPK for having the gall to investigate the notoriously 
corrupt institution.
 
Without Yudhoyono’s support, the Attorney General’s 
Office and the police may intimidate the KPK into 
shying away from targeting suspects with political 
backing. Without active efforts by the president to 
use his now-bolstered sway with the legislature, the 
Commission may be stripped of key investigatory 
powers and left without a credible court system for 
its cases. And without Yudhoyono’s acceptance of the 
fact that even his own political allies and relations 
can be targeted, the perception that the legal system 
only serves the wealthy and well connected would 
strengthen. The consequences of allowing the KPK 
to wither would be devastating. Corrupt politicians 
would be emboldened. Public confidence and trust in 
government would suffer.
We hope these moves are not indicative of the 
president’s true intentions for his second term. If they 
are, a withered KPK, marginalised reformers, and 
subservience to an oligarchic political elite may be the 
legacy Yudhoyono ends up leaving. 
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IntellIgence:
Names floated for Sri Mulyani’s replacement
A presidential palace insider tells the Report that Sri Mulyani Indrawati 
has submitted three professional, technocratic candidates to replace her as 
head of the Ministry of Finance. They are: Mahendra Siregar, deputy for 
international cooperation at the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy; 
Chatib Basri, special staff to the minister of finance; and Anggito Abimanyu, 
current head of fiscal policy at the Ministry of Finance.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has tapped Finance Minister Sri 
Mulyani as one of two candidates for the Bank Indonesia (BI) governorship 
recently vacated by now vice president-elect Boediono. 
The new candidates submitted for the position reflect Sri Mulyani’s efforts 
to reform the ministry. They are young, experienced professionals without 
clear political affiliations.
Anggito is widely viewed as Sri Mulyani’s right-hand man, having 
represented her at key meetings. Recently, Anggito went to Japan to meet 
with Japanese officials and businessmen – an agenda that was originally 
planned for Sri Mulyani herself. Chatib, who is both an advisor to Sri 
Mulyani and a noted academic, has followed in her footsteps to head the 
University of Indonesia’s Management and Economic Research Institute 
(LPEM UI) – a position she held until the late 1990’s. Mahendra came to 
the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, where he served terms in Washington DC and London. 
Yudhoyono had told Tempo magazine that Sri Mulyani would choose 
candidates to replace her at the ministry, and she’s likely to have submitted 
candidates she believes will continue her work. Nevertheless, her potential 
departure from the government has raised concern that her replacement 
might not have the same skills and political cunning she has shown during 
her tenure. 
Despite Anggito’s close relationship with Sri Mulyani, questions remain 
over his role in a corruption case involving legislators seeking bribes in 
connection with the recent financial stimulus package. He was summoned 
by the Corruption Eradication Commission as a witness against legislator 
Abdul Hadi Djamal. And the likely departure of Darmin Nasution from 
the Ministry of Finance’s Tax Directorate, where he was critical in rooting 
out corruption, further adds to concern. Darmin is one of two nominees 
to become senior BI deputy governor. 
Sri Mulyani began her stint as finance minister in December 2005 after 
heading the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) for 
more than a year. As minister, she has earned plaudits from international 
financial institutions and publications as well as from likeminded domestic 
reformers for her sound economic and financial policies, reform agenda, 
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and courage in the face political pressure. 
Last November, Sri Mulyani reportedly went so far as to submit her 
resignation in defence of a decision to lift a suspension in the trading of 
shares in Bumi Resources during the commodity price collapse in late 
2008. The company is owned by the family of magnate, senior Golkar 
Party figure, and coordinating minister for the people’s welfare, Aburizal 
Bakrie. 
Sri Mulyani had argued that lifting the suspension in trading and allowing 
Bumi’s share price to tumble was a necessary step to restore credibility of 
the country’s financial markets – even if it meant dealing a big blow to the 
already troubled finances of Bakrie, a political ally and key fundraiser for 
President Yudhoyono. 
Yudhoyono is believed to have approved the order for the suspension to 
be extended, prompting Sri Mulyani to threaten to resign. The president 
rejected her resignation, however, and the suspension was subsequently 
lifted. 
The House has yet to set a schedule for the Bank Indonesia governor 
selection process, so it is not yet clear when a potential new finance minister 
would be named. In mid-June, members of the House’s Commission XI 
for banking and financial affairs began conducting the fit-and-proper 
tests for Darmin and Gunarni Soeworo, the nominees for the position of 
BI senior deputy governor. Gunarni is an independent commissioner of 
state-owned Bank Mandiri. 
Can I get a witness!
Those in the Kalla-Wiranto and Megawati-Prabowo camps alleging 
systemic election fraud are unlikely to come up with the smoking gun-
quality evidence necessary to mount a serious protest of the election results. 
Insider sources tell the Report that, in contrast to President Yudhoyono’s 
team, neither campaign was able to put together a credible group to serve 
as party witnesses at polling stations throughout the country. 
In the legislative elections, many candidates themselves paid individuals 
in their electoral districts to serve as witnesses during the voting and vote 
count. In the presidential election, however, it was the parties that had to 
shell out cash for the witnesses at the 12,501 polling stations nationwide. 
At a minimum of Rp 100,000 (U.S. $9.80) per witness, the costs quickly 
added up. 
Surprisingly, even the Megawati-Prabowo team failed to come up with 
the cash. “Stop talking about paying the witnesses,” a source from their 
campaign team told the Report. “Prabowo has not paid the advertising 
expenses as of today because he has run out of money.”
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That may seem difficult to believe since former vice presidential candidate 
Prabowo Subianto’s personal wealth was reported to be a startling 1.7 
trillion rupiah (U.S. $167 million) – and that’s to say nothing of his 
billionaire brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo’s wealth. But campaign 
sources say that by election day, rifts and mismanagement of campaign 
funds left the team without access to cash (see below). 
“Don’t even talk about the vote counting process in the remote areas, as 
even here in Jakarta, the vote tally process is prone to possible violation,” 
said the campaign team source. “For instance, in the Menteng Pulo area 
(of Jakarta), there are about 26 ballot stations. None of the ballot stations 
could be monitored by us because we couldn’t pay for the witness to be 
there.”
The Megawati-Prabowo team weren’t the only ones unable to deploy 
witnesses nationwide, however. After much of its party apparatus at the 
local level jumped ship and joined the Democrats’ efforts, Golkar too 
found itself unable to secure its own witnesses. 
In previous elections, Golkar was believed to be the only party with the 
ability and organisation from village level to Jakarta to deploy witnesses to 
monitor the vote counting process. No longer, says the Megawati-Prabowo 
team source.  
“For the time being, Golkar’s political machine is no longer working well,” 
the source told the Report. “In the past, Golkar had village-level officials to 
monitor vote counting at poll stations. Today, however, those officials have 
been mobilized to support Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party.” 
A source close to Yudhoyono confirmed that many former local Golkar 
officials were now in the Yudhoyono camp. However, the main institutions 
charged with ensuring the integrity of the vote counting process weren’t 
the party witnesses, the source said. Instead, the police and the military – 
which maintain networks down to the village level – were responsible for 
guaranteeing that no parties interfere in the vote counting process.  
Campaign team rifts hamper Mega-Prabowo
While Megawati’s nearly 30 percent showing in the election was more 
support than many analysts and pollsters had predicted she would achieve, 
rifts between members of the campaign team loyal to Megawati and 
those loyal to Prabowo handicapped efforts to mount a serious challenge 
to Yudhoyono’s reelection bid, sources from the campaign teams tell the 
Report. 
“From the very beginning,” said a campaign member loyal to Prabowo, 
“we have questioned why Megawati should assign Theo Syafei as head of 
her success team given that Theo failed to secure a victory for [Megawati] 
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in the 2004 election. Was she putting together a winning team or a losing 
team?”
Theo, a retired two-star general who spent most of his career in the 
Army’s intelligence unit, is a former legislator and now a senior member 
of Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). 
Tensions also arose over the management of the campaign’s finances. A 
source from another political party, who is familiar with dynamics inside 
PDI-P, claimed that Hashim Djojohadikusumo decided to stop disbursing 
cash from Gerindra to PDI-P upon learning that some PDI-P executives – 
specifically PDI-P secretary general Pramono Anung and legislator Tjahjo 
Kumolo – failed to distribute the funds to party operatives at the local 
level. Instead, claims the source, the PDI-P executives kept the money for 
themselves.
To make matters worse, campaign team members with military 
backgrounds and those from civilian backgrounds have also clashed, with 
the civilians accusing the former military members of profiting at the 
expense of the campaign.
 “In the April legislative election, Prabowo assigned his ex-military friend, 
Muchdi Purwoprandjono, to coordinate party witnesses,” the source told 
the Report. “But as the money was disbursed, no witnesses for [Prabowo’s] 
Gerindra Party were in the field.” 
Muchdi is a retired two-star special forces general who has been a fixture 
in the news since going on trial for the murder of human rights activist 
Munir Said Thalib in 2004. Muchdi was acquitted on December 31, 
2008. In mid-June, the Supreme Court threw out an appeal of the verdict, 
citing procedural reasons, but failed to make public the decision until July 
10. The court has yet to explain why the announcement of the appeal’s 
rejection was delayed. 
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A change to the House rules 
Tucked away in the backlog of bills waiting to be passed in the House of 
Representatives is a piece of legislation that has the potential to alter the 
rules of the political game. Susunan dan Pendudukan, known as the susduk 
law, will regulate the structure and function of Indonesia’s legislative 
institutions and their relations with executive government at the central 
and regional levels. It will define the arenas of power for President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, the Democrat Party, and other parties in the House 
for the next five years. 
The susduk law currently exists as Law 22/2003, but a number of 
proposed amendments are being debated. The current law is one of many 
political laws that were to be redrafted in the lead up to the recent election, 
including laws on political parties, the presidential election system, and 
the legislative election system.
The latter laws had to be completed for the election to take place, so 
debate on the susduk was given lowest priority. Political parties were also 
reluctant to finalise the rules for the operation of the House until the 
election results revealed the relative power of each party. Only after the 
election could the parties know how to formulate the amendments to give 
themselves maximum advantage under the new law.
Now that the October inauguration of the new House and government 
is looming, the susduk bill cannot be put off any longer as it provides the 
legal basis for the rules of procedure for the House and regional legislative 
bodies. Without these rules, the legislatures cannot operate.
Many of the proposed amendments appear insignificant, but there are two 
proposals that may alter the balance of political power, both within the 
House and between the House and the executive in ways that could have 
a big effect on the efficiency of the government for the next five years.
One area of potential change is the process of selecting the House leadership 
– the speaker and four deputy speakers. One proposal has the largest 
party in the House automatically taking the speaker’s chair. The counter 
suggestion is that the leadership be a collective body, with representatives 
from the five largest parties each holding one leadership position.
Under the first proposal, the largest party would be guaranteed the 
speaker’s position. Under the second, the position would be chosen 
through a process of backroom negotiations, and endorsed in a plenary 
session. In this scenario, the prized office may not necessarily go to the 
largest party. Such an instance would be similar to the aftermath of the 
1999 election when the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) 
held the largest number of seats in the House, but the speaker was a Golkar 
member. 
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Not surprisingly, since the April election, the Democrat Party has supported 
the proposal to automatically award the speaker’s gavel to the party with 
the largest House delegation. All other parties have backed the proposal 
for a collectively elected leadership. There were media reports that the 
Democrats were backing down, but since Yudhoyono’s sweeping victory 
in the presidential election, the party has reaffirmed its original position.
If they have their way, the Democrats will control the most powerful 
positions in both the executive and legislative branches of government. 
Since the party is still well short of a majority in the House, the speaker’s 
influence could be critical to the president’s efforts to pass legislation and 
to kerb the House’s tendency to mount critical inquiries into government 
actions.
The second potentially decisive amendment to the susduk law concerns 
those critical inquiries. Under this amendment, the president would be 
required to appear before the House if he were summoned to answer 
questions about his policies or actions, potentially altering the balance 
of power between the House and the president. Apart from the power 
to make laws and to review, amend or reject government legislation, any 
legislature’s greatest power is its authority to call the executive branch to 
account. 
It remains unclear under the proposed amendment whether, if the House 
decides to conduct an inquiry into a government action, a minister or 
other government official may appear the president’s the behalf. This issue 
blew up repeatedly during Yudhoyono’s first term in office, over issues 
such as the increase in oil prices, the import of foreign rice, and Indonesia’s 
support of UN sanctions against Iran. 
The Democrat Party unsurprisingly opposes the suggestion that the 
president be compelled to appear before a House committee. Most other 
parties, however, have supported the idea. They are likely to continue to 
do so even if they enter into a coalition with the Democrat Party that 
allows them to have party members in the cabinet. Parties want both 
cabinet positions and the authority for their lawmakers in the House to 
call on the president to appear.
The parties’ “have your cake and eat it too” attitude reflects the continued 
challenges of compelling cabinet members to help secure support from 
their respective parties’ House factions, a practice that is still foreign to 
Indonesian political culture in the post-Suharto era. 
In fact, one of the main reasons Yudhoyono will again include non-
Democrat party figures in his new cabinet is because, despite his landslide 
victory, he wants to reduce the parties’ tendency to use their combined 
strength in the House as an instrument of political opposition.
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The susduk law currently being finalised in the House will settle these two 
institutional rules which, despite their seemingly arcane nature, should 
be closely watched for their potential impact on the second Yudhoyono 
administration.
Public service law a step toward reform*
The new public service law adopted by the House of Representatives 
on June 23 after four years of deliberation is a laudable attempt by the 
current government to reform the country’s bureaucracy. However, a 
comprehensive legal infrastructure that would allow an overhaul of 
Indonesia’s entire government apparatus is still not in place, despite the 
reform rhetoric of the Yudhoyono administration over the past five years. 
Several contentious articles were discussed until the very last moment, 
including those related to special services for groups such as pregnant 
women, elderly, and children, as well as articles on dispute settlement 
mechanisms and sanctions. Still, the bill passed with the support of all ten 
House factions. 
The law aims to increase the accountability of the Indonesian government 
and covers public services in health, transportation, infrastructure, and 
several others sectors.
Key provisions of the law:
The creation of public service standards as well as a public service •	
announcement and information system.
The establishment of clear regulations on the rights and obligations •	
of public service providers, mechanism of supervision, and public 
participation, as well as reprimands for public service providers who 
provide poor quality service. For example:
Citizens are given the power to sue public service providers in cases  ○
of negligence;
The government can issue written warnings to high ranking public  ○
service officials who fail to provide service, and officials are then 
given three months to address the problems;
Public service institution officials who fail to deliver public service  ○
may have their salaries reduced; 
Private institutions that provide public services must address  ○
complaints within six months, otherwise licenses can be revoked;
State-owned and private institutions must provide public services  ○
indiscriminately.
* The following two briefs were provided by Michael Buehler, Postdoctoral Fellow in 
Modern Southeast Asian Studies at Columbia University in New York. He can be 
reached at mb3120@columbia.ed
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The actual scope of the new law remains unclear, especially in regard to 
the standard of service required. Several government regulations and a 
presidential regulation are expected to outline details of the law within the 
next six months. 
New law part of broader reform efforts 
The law is part of a larger effort of the Yudhoyono administration to 
gradually reform Indonesia’s notorious civil service apparatus.
At least six other reform bills await approval (see box on following page). 
In addition to the newly adopted public service law, the passage of the 
governance administration bill and an amendment to the civil service 
law No 43/1999 would form the foundation necessary to implement 
fundamental bureaucratic reform. 
Progress has been slow with regard to both laws, however. The governance 
administration bill, which aims to increase transparency and accountability 
as well as strengthen the role of citizens in the political process, has not 
been adopted despite being under deliberation since 2005. 
Likewise, reform efforts under the civil service law have been stalled. The 
first civil service law of the post-New Order period, law no 43/1999, 
required the establishment of the National Civil Service Commission 
(Komisi Kepegawaian Negara) which would be responsible for human 
resource management within the bureaucracy. Such a commission has yet 
to be established despite the fact that the law was adopted 10 years ago. 
Furthermore, the capacity of the National Civil Service Agency (BKN-
Badan Kepegawaian Negara), which is charged with managing government 
personnel, remains weak. 
In addition, the recruitment system for most state institutions remains 
flawed and corrupt, requiring bribes to enter civil service positions and 
for promotions. A few ministries have introduced reforms in the payment 
system for bureaucrats, but this only accounts for around two percent of 
the countries more than four million bureaucrats. In other words, built-in 
performance criteria for salary systems remain absent in most government 
agencies.
Overcoming bureaucratic inertia
The reluctance of the House to adopt these bills in the past five years shows 
that Indonesia is still struggling to implement deep-reaching bureaucratic 
reform. There are a number of reasons for this.
Considerable influence of bureaucracy in drafting of laws. There are many 
opportunities for bureaucrats to influence the content of reform laws. The 
deliberation of a law usually requires legislators to consult with bureaucrats 
in the State Secretariat, the Justice and Human Rights Ministry, as well 
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Important reform bills under deliberation
Public Service Law1.  
Status: passed 23 June 2009 
Governance administration bill2.  
Establishes standard administration procedure for all government •	
agencies
Sets rules that ensure government administrations allow the public •	
input during the policy-making process 
Facilitates public access to administrative documents •	
Status:  under deliberation 
Amendment to civil service law No. 43/19993.  
Establishes a National Civil Service Commission •	
Aims to improves civil servants’ efficiency and performance •	
Secures the neutrality and improved welfare of civil servants •	
Status:  under deliberation 
Ethics in state governance bill 4. 
Outlines code of ethics for state administrators •	
Defines minimum standards for newly hired state administrators •	
Status:  under deliberation 
Authority between central and local governments bill 5. 
Defines role of governors•	
Specifies decentralisation tasks •	
Status:  under deliberation 
Public service institution and non-profit organisation bill6.  
Revises Civil Society Organisation Law No 8/1985 •	
Outlines registration procedures for non-profit organisations with •	
the government 
Establishes rules on foreign funding of non-profit organisations •	
to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorist groups 
through nongovernmental organisations 
Status:  under deliberation 
National supervision system bill7.  
Provides working guidelines for supervisory institutions •	
Gives reporting mechanisms of audit results from supervisory •	
institutions 
Sets out mechanisms and guarantees for audit report deliveries to •	
investigation bodies 
Manages the implementation of audit reports, handling audit •	
report follow-up, and relations among supervisory institutions
Status:  under deliberation 
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as the Civil Service Agency. These bureaucrats are supposed to assist in 
the drafting of regulations that may potentially be used against them. 
Hence, elements within the government apparatus water down bills with 
the potential for reform early in the policy cycle.
Stymied implementation. Once adopted, laws require regulations on 
implementation as well as presidential and ministerial decrees in order 
to be effective. This offers the bureaucracy another opportunity to block 
civil service reforms. 
Reforms tough to sustain. Bureaucrats remain well-protected under the 
current civil service law. Firing them is nearly impossible, regardless of 
their violations, making it very hard for reform-minded politicians to 
anchor changes within the bureaucracy. In the past decade, bureaucrats 
would wait out reform-minded politicians, who must stand for reelection 
after five years. Once progressive politicians were replaced, it was back to 
business as usual for the civil servants.
New investigations show KPK can still bite 
In June 2009, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) showed it 
remains committed to tackling corruption by declaring several former and 
current legislators as suspects in a long-neglected but high-profile bribery 
scandal. By pursuing active lawmakers on whose vote the extension of 
the Anti-Corruption Court depends, the KPK has shown that it has not 
softened its approach towards combating graft and taking on state officials 
linked to crime. 
The suspects in the bribery scandal – identified as Hamka Yandhu, 
a former Golkar Party legislator, Udju Djuhaeri, a member of the 
Indonesian Military faction in the 2000-2004 national parliament, Endin 
EJ Soefihara, a current United Development Party (PPP) legislator and 
Dudhie Makmun Murod of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P) – stand accused of receiving payments in exchange for their votes 
to elect Bank Indonesia deputy governor Miranda Goeltom in 2004 (see 
box). 
In mid-June, KPK spokesman Johan Budi said the Commission had not 
yet decided when to begin investigating the four suspects. Meanwhile, 
Miranda Goeltom has neither been declared a suspect nor been questioned 
by the KPK.  
Accusations of leniency amid increasing political pressure
The KPK’s naming former and current lawmakers suspects in a scandal 
involving legislators accepting money in exchange for supporting the 
selection of Miranda Goeltom as a Bank Indonesia deputy governor in 
June 2004 follows months of accusations that, after making little progress 
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on several major cases, the Commission was excessively lenient.
One such case concerned payments of Bank Indonesia money to 
prosecutors at the Attorney General’s Office as part of an attempt to free 
former bank officials involved in the embezzlement of Bank Indonesia 
Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) funds in 1998. Another halted investigation 
involved senior prosecutors in an Rp 6 billion (U.S. $588,000) scheme to 
stop the prosecution of banking tycoon Syamsul Nursalim.
Several corruption cases have been halted or stalled altogether after 
politicians and bureaucrats returned embezzled money to the government 
via the KPK. A bribery case involving several legislators was stalled in 2007 
after the lawmakers returned money to the Indonesian government after 
admitting they had received the funds from Bank Indonesia’s Banking 
Development Foundation (YPPI) in 2003. Likewise, Indonesia’s former 
health minister Ahmad Sujudi and his former secretary general Daddy 
Aryadireja were let off the hook after they returned to the KPK Rp 700 
million each – money they had stolen from a Ministry of Health project. 
Such decisions were in direct violation of Article 4 of the 1999 corruption 
law, which stipulates that individuals cannot absolve themselves of crimes 
simply by returning money linked to corrupt practices.
At the same time that doubts about the KPK’s political will to fight 
corruption in higher places have lingered, the commission has come under 
mounting political pressure. First, its ability to bring cases before the Anti-
Corruption Court is based on the aforementioned anti-corruption law. 
The House of Representatives has until December 2009 to pass a new law 
for the court. If it fails to do so, there is the possibility of a presidential 
regulation-in-lieu-of-law to extend the court, but that would still require 
ratification by the legislature within six months. 
Meanwhile, the current House term ends in October, and incumbent 
lawmakers have shown little initiative to pass the bill. In addition, soon 
after the arrest of KPK chief Antasari Azhar in April 2009, investigators 
at the commission were summoned before the House and told that the 
anti-graft body was no longer legally valid. House members argued that 
the anti-corruption law adopted in 2002 and on which the commission’s 
work is based, stipulated that the KPK had to be run by five executives. 
Antasari’s suspension, they contended, violated this provision. 
KPK initiates proactive strategies 
On June 9, the KPK presented new strategies in its fight against the 
abuse of public office for private gain. Officials at the commission voiced 
their intention to weed out illegal fees in the bureaucracy by conducting 
unannounced inspections on a regular basis followed by close monitoring of 
public service offices. Furthermore, the KPK announced plans to conduct 
inspections of regional budget reports, a first in Indonesian politics.  
The  Condro bribery case
May 2004
Megawati Sukarnoputri, then 
president, nominates Miranda 
Goeltom to replace Anwar 
Nasution, now chairman of the 
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), 
as senior deputy governor at 
Bank of Indonesia. 
The national parliament voted 
Miranda Goeltom into office 
soon thereafter.
December 2008
Miranda’s appointment becomes 
mired in controversy when former 
parliamentarian Agus Condro 
Prayitno informs the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) 
that he had received Rp 500 
million (U.S. $49,000) in 
travellers cheques a few days after 
Miranda won approval from the 
parliament’s commission IX on 
finance and banking affairs.
Agus Condro names a total 
of 41 parliamentarians who 
had received bribes to vote for 
Miranda’s appointment. 
June 2009
The KPK declares four 
parliamentarians as suspects in 
the Condro case. 
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The KPK showed its determination to follow through with its plans by 
inspecting Jakarta’s five integrated service offices in early June, in addition 
to unveiling plans to convey the results of its inspections to mayors and 
district government heads so that they could improve public services. In 
the future, regular meetings may be held between the KPK and members 
of the executive branch of government to provide technical guidance and 
opportunities to share knowledge about good governance.
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FEATURE:
A One Horse Race
On July 8, voters confirmed what many polls and surveys have indicated for 
months: The race for the presidency wasn’t even close. Programs targeted 
at the poor and politically marginalised successfully brought millions of 
voters into incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s camp, 
while sensible economic policies have endeared him to the international 
and local business community. 
So what does Yudhoyono’s decisive repeat victory mean for the country? 
Will he take it as a mandate for more aggressive reform? What does it mean 
for the major political parties? And finally, could lingering questions over 
the legitimacy of the electoral process possibly undermine the president’s 
authority?
The Report looks at those questions and more.
One and done
Winning the three-way race with an astonishing near-60 percent of the vote 
ostensibly strengthens the president’s hand to push forward with a reform 
agenda. Whether he uses this popular mandate to take on entrenched 
political interests is an open question, however, and early indications 
suggest he will remain cautious. 
Some signs of caution are already evident in the president’s moves to 
assemble a new cabinet. Early talk from the president’s camp concerning 
cabinet selection and legislation has disappointed those calling for a more 
active approach to reform. Sources within the Yudhoyono camp and other 
political parties say that the president plans to dole out half of the cabinet 
seats to politicians representing key political parties and constituencies, 
including the military and the political parties in the Democrat Party’s 
coalition. 
Similarly, the president has thus far remained aloof in regard to the 
legislation waiting in the House. Rather than use his popularity to 
demand action from legislators, and rather than urging the bureaucracy to 
provide support and input during the bill-drafting process, he has allowed 
deliberations over key bills to drag on for years. Moreover, Yudhoyono 
has seemed suspiciously reluctant to defend the Corruption Eradication 
Commission and the Anti-Corruption Court from attacks by politicians 
eager to see those bodies’ powers eroded. 
Having been directly elected in successive elections, and with approval 
ratings at unheard of levels for a sitting president, one might think 
Yudhoyono would feel emancipated from the political interests and system 
of patronage and favours that have long held the political establishment 
together. 
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His unwillingness to break free from this system is due probably to some 
combination of his preference for operating by consensus, rather than 
taking the lead and hoping others fall into line, and his political formation 
during the Suharto and early reform era years. He is notorious for his 
unwillingness to stick his neck out on potentially controversial issues, even 
at the expense of his own agenda. In addition, sources tell the Report that 
Yudhoyono remains convinced that he needs Golkar’s political machinery 
behind him. 
Sunny Tanuwidjaja from the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies told the Report that the retired army general also remains fearful 
that he could meet the same fate as former president Abdurrahman “Gus 
Dur” Wahid, who was impeached after only 20 months in office. “That is 
his personal fear – what happened in 2001,” Sunny says of Yudhoyono’s 
concern that taking on the political establishment too forcefully will result 
in his demise.  
Focus on legacy
Political analysts agree that the president is very much looking to make 
a lasting mark on the country’s political development and in redefining 
Indonesia’s image and place in the world. 
His selection of Boediono as his vice presidential candidate suggested that 
Yudhoyono sees part of his potential legacy as returning Indonesia to more 
solid economic footing and restoring its status as a high-growth economic 
success story, so damaged by the prolonged economic and political crisis 
that struck in the late 1990s. Achieving that goal, however, will require 
more than a professional economist as his number two, and a proven 
reformer in Sri Mulyani Indrawati at Bank Indonesia, where she appears 
to be heading. 
Professionals with the skills – but no less importantly, the willpower and 
courage – to push through reforms are needed in a whole host of positions 
traditionally handed out political parties. Those include not just the 
finance minister, the coordinating ministry for the economy, and the trade 
minister, but also the minister for state-owned enterprises and industry, 
as well as the chiefs at the Investment Coordinating Board, and the State 
Ministry of National Planning and Development among others. 
In addition to bringing in the right people, Yudhoyono will have to 
move quickly if he wants to make fundamental changes. “If he’s planning 
on being dynamic, he’s got half a term to do it,” says Jeffrey Winters, a 
professor of political science at Northwestern University in Illinois and a 
long-time Indonesia watcher. Indonesia, he explains, has no experience 
with lame-duck second-term presidents, and the president may find as 
his term passes its midpoint that it is increasingly difficult to influence a 
political establishment with its sights set on the 2014 elections. 
Keep an eye out for:
Pramono Anung and Puan making 
moves to replace Megawati as 
PDI-P chairwoman
Attempts by Golkar executives to 
move up a key party meeting in 
an effort to replace Jusuf Kalla as 
party chairman
Golkar’s return to the coalition 
supporting Yudhoyono
Moves by the president to further 
cut fuel and electricity subsidies to 
make other politically costly but 
necessary economic reforms
Whether the president appoints 
politicians or technocrats to key 
secondary economic posts such 
as the minister for state-owned 
enterprises and the development 
planning agency top job 
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Moreover, he has no clear successor within his party or his family. No 
up-and-coming Democrat Party politician has anything near Yudhoyono’s 
cache, and his children have thus far steered clear of the spotlight. His 
elder son, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono is in the military. And while his 
younger son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, has entered the political fray and 
was often seen at his father’s side during the campaign, he does not appear 
ready to take the reigns of the party. 
Precarious popularity
Ironically, Yudhoyono may owe his victory, in part, to the global financial 
crisis. Just a year ago, thousands of protesters took to the streets after 
skyrocketing international oil prices forced the administration to backtrack 
on promises not to hike the price of subsidised fuel products, and former 
president Megawati Sukarnoputri’s popularity briefly eclipsed that of 
Yudhoyono. 
A drop in the price of oil as a result of the financial crisis allowed 
Yudhoyono to reduce the prices of subsidised fuel products without unduly 
straining the state budget. The subsequent drop in the price of basic goods 
correlates closely with a rebound in Yudhoyono’s ratings and those of his 
government. 
In March 2008, when the Gallup organisation asked Indonesians about 
conditions in the country, oil hovered around U.S. $100 per barrel. It 
was to pass $130 per barrel by the time the government finally relented 
and raised the price of subsidised fuel products. By April and May of this 
year when Gallup asked again, it had settled back down to between $40 
and $60, and subsidised fuel prices had again been cut. That may help 
explain the more favourable feelings Indonesians held about the trajectory 
of conditions in the country and Yudhoyono’s performance. And as an 
incumbent running on what essentially amounted to a “more of the same” 
message, Yudhoyono is likely to have benefited substantially from the fall 
in prices.
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Source: Most Indonesians Approve of Incumbent Ahead of Election, Gallup Poll, July 3 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/121388/Indonesians-Approve-Incumbent-Ahead-Election.aspx
The spike in oil prices may also have been an important motivating factor 
in Yudhoyono’s decision to provide greater assistance to the poor. A whole 
slate of measures – most notably the direct cash assistance to the poor 
to make up for the fuel price hikes – have done a great deal to win the 
president new supporters and to retain old ones. 
The lessons are clear for him. Despite his meteoric approval ratings and 
the apparent ease with which he and his party have coasted to victory, 
Yudhoyono may be wise to jealously guard his popularity. 
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Perilous parties
The defeat of Kalla and Megawati in the presidential election is likely to 
prompt critical changes within their respective parties that will influence 
their behaviour and character in the coming years. Both parties look like 
they’re imploding, but both also have more sophisticated party apparatuses 
on which to stake their hopes for the future than does the Democrat 
Party. 
Golkar Party 
Jusuf Kalla’s days as Golkar chairman are numbered. It’s no secret that 
multiple factions within Golkar were disappointed by Kalla’s decision to 
split from Yudhoyono and mount his own presidential bid. Now, with 
Kalla having barely received 10 percent of the vote, those factions are 
poised to oust him as party chairman. 
The key showdown is between Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh, both of 
whom aspire to lead the party. Paloh, however, is inclined to take Golkar 
into an opposition coalition with Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle (PDI-P), while Bakrie would like to bring the party back into 
a pro-Yudhoyono coalition with the Democrat Party. 
Some in Golkar even believe that the Golkar faction headed by Bakrie 
was a factor in Yudhoyono’s victory, says political analyst Wimar Witoelar. 
According to the theory, what Wimar calls the “pre-Kalla” Golkar Party 
– particularly Bakrie, Agung Laksono, and Akbar Tandjung – delivered 
Golkar votes to Yudhoyono, helping account for his landslide victory.   
That theory may seem like another instance of Golkar failing to recognise 
that its heyday has passed, but Yudhoyono may very well welcome Golkar 
back into the fold in the hopes of having a jumbo coalition to support his 
efforts in the legislature.
PDI-P 
Former president Megawati Sukarnoputri’s tenure as party chairman is 
also as good as over. She has now failed in successive presidential bids, and 
has done little to build the party in between. 
Indeed, Megawati’s run for president almost did not happen at all. 
According to Jeffrey Winters, it was only Prabowo Subianto’s desire to be 
a central player in this election that allowed Megawati to remain relevant 
even as her authority and popularity has declined. “The only reason she’s 
not politically flat-lined is because Prabowo has her on life support,” says 
Winters. “She couldn’t even make a presidential ticket, and they rolled her 
in on a gurney, Prabowo gave her electric shock and she was revived.”
Now the drive to replace Megawati as PDI-P chairwoman can begin in 
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earnest. Her daughter Puan Maharani, newly elected to the legislature, 
has become a party fixture through the course of the campaign. But while 
she would represent an effort to keep leadership of the party within the 
Sukarno bloodline, she is not without competition – and she may not 
even be her mother’s chosen successor. 
At a recent speech in front of foreign journalists, Megawati remarked 
that Puan is far from the heir apparent. “It could be her, she is a strong 
candidate,” Megawati said of her daughter. “But it could also be [PDI-P 
Secretary General] Pak Pramono [Anung], Pak Budiman Sudjatmiko and 
other cadres from PDI-P who are capable.” 
Puan’s political ascent, says Winters, is more the project of Megawati’s 
husband Taufik Kiemas than of Megawati. In an exclusive interview 
with the Report last year, Kiemas said that it was Puan’s “destiny” to enter 
politics. Of the relationship between Megawati and Puan, Winters says, “I 
think there is some mother-daughter rivalry there.”
Jumbo coalition
Golkar’s potential return to the coalition with the Democrat Party would 
have significant implications for checks and balances in the political 
system. Parties loyal to Yudhoyono would control upwards of 80 percent 
of the House. Even though party discipline in the next legislature is likely 
to be less than it is in the current one as a result of new electoral rules, 
Yudhoyono would be able to push through legislation far more easily than 
he currently can. 
That may be a good thing for the passage of key reform bills that have long 
languished in the legislature. It may also prove detrimental to the long-
term development of the legislature’s capacity to deliberate and serve as a 
forum for debate, as well as a check on the executive. 
DPT issues
As with April’s legislative election, the presidential election was marred 
by the uncertainty surrounding the integrity and planning of the election 
process. An eleventh hour change to the key regulations on who could cast 
a ballot likely made the election more fair. The tacit admission, however, 
that the presidential electoral system – and by extension, the legislative 
electoral system – had significant flaws, has emboldened the president’s 
political opponents and portends more problems for the local elections in 
coming years.
On July 6, two days before the vote, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
eligible voters could use their state-issued identification cards to vote – 
regardless of whether their names were on the flawed final voters list. The 
ruling came in response to a request filed by two Centre for Electoral 
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Reform (CETRO) researchers, Refly Harun and Maheswara Prabandono, 
for a judicial review of two articles of the Law on Presidential Elections. 
The immediate impact of the ruling on the election was not clear, since there 
was no clear record of who had initially been left off the list. Most analysts 
had concluded that the flaws afflicting the voter list were geographically 
dispersed. And while much of the suspicion about the list was cast on 
the president’s Democrat Party, there was no concrete evidence that its 
members were disproportionately represented on the voter list.  
The problems with the voter list, however, remain a blot on Yudhoyono’s 
record. While allowing voters not on the list to cast their ballots using 
their identification cards was a reasonable short-term remedy for the 
voter list problems, the lack of seriousness and commitment the president 
has shown to addressing the problems has deepened the suspicion of his 
critics. Jeffrey Winters helped bring to light the extent of the evidence 
suggesting electoral fraud in the East Java gubernatorial race. According 
to him, Yudhoyono’s image stands to suffer from the re-emergence of the 
issue just prior to the election. 
“The bottom line is this,” Winters told the Report. “So far SBY looks 
Teflon on this. But the problem is that this is his KPU [General Elections 
Commission]. He had roughly 60 percent support in the legislature to 
make it his KPU, so the quality of this KPU represents his choices.”
The issue failed to make a larger splash ahead of the legislative election, 
Winters says, because legislative candidates had run out of campaign 
funds and were thus unwilling to push for a delay in the vote to rectify the 
list. Moreover, party elites were focussed on the larger prize of capturing 
the presidency, rather than spending their precious political capital over 
what would likely result in only minor changes in the composition of the 
legislature. 
In the days leading to the presidential election, however, no such 
constraints existed. Moreover, the hapless KPU’s failure to provide copies 
of the voter list to the presidential campaign teams allowed the Kalla-
Wiranto and Megawati-Prabowo teams to capitalise on the issue. “What 
provoked this was the KPU failure to provide the list,” says Winters of 
the flurry of meetings, press conferences, and media statements by the 
campaigns warning of electoral fraud and calling for action by the KPU or 
Constitutional Court. 
Restoring credibility to the broader election regime will be important, as the 
East Java case represents. While the large margin of Yudhoyono’s victory is 
likely to prevent protests and a protracted dispute over the election result, 
the same KPU that oversaw shambolic preparations for the legislative 
and presidential elections will remain responsible for administering local 
elections that could be decided by closer margins.
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PresentatIon:
As a top political analyst and the moderator of the first presidential debate, Anies Baswedan witnessed this presidential election from the front row. On July 9, Anies – himself rumoured as a potential future presidential candidate 
– participated in a panel hosted by the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club analysing President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s reelection. Baswedan’s wide-ranging remarks have been edited for brevity and clarity, and should not be 
regarded as a complete transcript.
On the tradition of voting in 
Indonesia
In the elections yesterday, we did 
not see many surprises. It was, as 
predicted, one round and SBY 
[Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] 
was the winner in a landslide.
There are a few issues that I would like to discuss. 
Number one is with regard to voters, who were 
generally quite peaceful and willing to accept the result 
– I think this is one sign of 
confidence in our democracy. 
The general public is used to 
going to elections, casting 
their vote, going back home, 
and waiting for the result and 
then moving on. That has 
been done at the village level 
for years and years with the 
elections of local leaders. 
During Suharto’s time, despite 
it not being democracy, an 
electoral process was there. 
So people would come and 
vote and they knew some of the results did not reflect 
their votes because of the Golkar and military political 
machinery that cooked the numbers. However, they’d 
come to vote, go home, and move on. And that was 
done for more than thirty years. This provides a solid 
foundation for democratization for Indonesia. So, 
despite the problems of voter registration in April, we 
did not see a major problem right after the elections, 
and we see the same thing today.
I think we need to give credit to the people of Indonesia 
for going to vote, coming back, and moving on. This 
means that candidates who lose will have to accept the 
result because people generally accept the result, so you 
do not have enough of a support base to challenge the 
election result once the election is over. A similar case 
was in the Pilkada [local elections]. Of the more than 
500, about 120 went to court. They were settled, and 
as soon as the court decided, people moved on – except 
for a few areas, like North Sulawesi and then in East 
Java, but those are quite minor in terms of numbers. 
On the role of Islamic organisations in politics
Number two, a note on this interesting camp of support 
for Jusuf Kalla (JK). All the 
Islamic organisations who were 
in the camp of JK – Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Muhammadiyah, 
Persis, you name it, it’s a long 
list of Islamic organizations – 
officially endorsed JK. 
And nothing was there in the 
elections. It is a moment of 
truth, perhaps, that many of 
these Islamic organizations 
were actually unable to, one, 
influence those they claim 
as their members or what 
they claim as their mass. And two, perhaps there 
is a detachment between those who belong to the 
organisations and the leadership of the organisations.  
I think this was a historic moment in Indonesia politics, 
in which Islam has always been seen as a major factor, 
and yesterday we saw that this was not the case. If NU 
was endorsing JK, we should have seen East Java and 
Central Java delivering their vote for JK. But that was 
not the case. Muhammadiyah, NU similar thing. 
We need to take that into account as we assess the future 
role of these Islamic organisations.  I think they have 
“It is a moment 
of truth that 
many Islamic 
organizations were 
actually unable to 
influence those 
they claim as their 
members.”
Paramadina University Rector Anies Baswedan  
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challengers internally from their own members, from 
the leadership who are not in favour of making open 
endorsements in the way it was done, and externally 
from the elected members of government who were 
not endorsed during the elections. Perhaps for a few 
months, there’ll be a period of [detachment between 
the religious leaders and the government] and then 
they will be able to connect with each other again. 
And this is one thing that we must take into account.
On protesting results
For the losing parties, to actually continue discussing 
[allegations of electoral fraud] may not be a good idea 
– especially if they’re thinking about 2014. If you’re 
thinking 2014, accept it, salute the president and move 
on, and people will respect you. Nowhere in the world 
are there elections with zero [vote] discrepancies. For 
example, in the 1960s in the election between Nixon 
and Kennedy, Nixon was 
going to challenge the 
result and he decided not 
to do it. Instead he waited 
eight more years for the 
presidency. Some people do 
not want to wait that long, 
but we’ll have to see about 
that.
On the SBY landslide
With regard to public support for SBY, we have seen in 
the polls that the public is generally happy. One of the 
reasons for that is the early campaign by SBY and the 
Democratic Party. Why was there an early campaign? 
We must credit the price of oil, which reached its peak 
in June last year. The government had to increase the 
price of petrol and because of that, the popularity of 
the president dropped to its lowest level in the history 
of this administration. That was a wake up call for the 
president and the party.  
At that time, Golkar and PDI-P [Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle] were still enjoying very 
strong support of around 18 to 19 percent in the 
polls and the Democrats were only at 7 percent, one 
of their lowest levels. The president was around 48 
or 47 percent. This was a really important milestone 
and is necessary for understanding what is happening 
today. Right after that, the strategic campaign [by 
the Democratic Party] was launched while other 
political parties did not start their campaigns. New 
candidates, new political parties started that early too. 
The established political parties were not that quick in 
trying to engage with the voters. 
It is not only about the government doing a good job. 
Generally people see it as doing a good job – but it is 
the fact that you [the voter] are being reminded that 
the conditions you are experiencing today are very 
positive. I’ll give you an example. Today, we take it 
for granted that the air conditioning is working fine. 
We don’t talk about it. What if I started to talk about 
it, saying, “Look at the temperature, every time you 
come here, it is cool.” If [I] do that on a regular basis, 
you start to appreciate the work of the managers. You 
start thinking, “The managers are actually doing a very 
good job.”
That was done [by the SBY 
campaign] in a period from 
around September to March. 
Around that time people 
started to remember the 
[social programs]. The BLT 
[direct cash assistance] was 
there since 2005. PNPM 
[national program for 
community empowerment] 
had been there for some time. There was nothing new 
about them. The subsidies for schools are nothing new. 
But as soon as you are reminded of them, you suddenly 
start to appreciate them. That’s an important aspect [of 
the campaign] that we must take into account.  
Another thing with regard to level of satisfaction. 
People often ask why the level of satisfaction of 
education and social services was that high – this is 
in the polls. We must understand that for people in 
many areas, they are basically moving from no service 
into service. So it is not about a level of expectation 
that is low or high. Instead it’s when you did not 
receive money and suddenly you receive money. That’s 
different. I think [it’s effective] if you campaign by 
asking these questions, “Is this the first financial crisis 
you are experiencing?” The answer is “no.” “Is this the 
first government that has come to you with money?” 
“JK was not only 
campaigning against 
SBY, but also 
against time.”
Van Zorge Report — July 15, 2009
27
The answer is “yes.” When that is being repeated over 
and over, it sticks in people’s minds and that explains 
the LSI survey. 
The LSI-conducted survey of satisfaction towards 
many services, like education and social services, 
generally shows flat or falling levels of satisfaction. But 
in the second semester of last year, it started to move 
up a little bit and continued to do so. By early 2009, 
the level of satisfaction was quite high. We didn’t see a 
change in curriculum or salary of the teachers, so why 
was the level of satisfaction of education so high? I 
think an effective campaign was the big factor there. In 
that campaign, JK was not in the picture; it was always 
SBY and that is one of the reasons [for Yudhoyono’s 
success].
On Jusuf Kalla’s 
performance 
JK was not only campaigning 
against SBY, but also against 
time. He had only two 
months, and campaigning 
for 170 million people in 
two months is extremely 
difficult. With the incumbent 
candidate generally seen as 
successful, the entry point for the campaign was rather 
tough. Still he moved from two percent to 12 percent 
– which is not just a 10 percent change, it’s a six-fold 
increase. 
Those were the numbers he was seeing, which is quite 
significant. If the elections were not held yesterday, we 
might expect something different. He may not have 
beaten SBY, but I think time was one of the reasons 
[for his loss]. The elections design somewhat favours 
the incumbent, generally speaking. Candidacies are 
announced after the general election, and then the 
presidential election campaigns are only two months 
long. So if the incumbent is doing fine, he is most 
likely reelected. If there are problems, then it is easier 
for challengers to actually challenge because of the 
time frame. 
On the Megawati-Prabowo ticket
Yesterday, there was a rather large discrepancy between 
the exit polls and the quick count results for Megawati. 
The exit poll was much lower than the quick count. 
And that’s interesting because people did actually vote 
for Megawati, but when they left and were surveyed, 
they did not actually admit to voting for Megawati. 
That’s the reality. There must be some psychological 
pressure, or they don’t feel comfortable showing that 
they voted for Mega because people may ask why. 
Also, Prabowo’s contributions [to the ticket’s result] 
were quite significant. If you look at surveys, Mega 
was at around 16 to 19 percent. Now she’s at 28 to 29 
percent. That additional support, the way I look at it, 
is a contribution from Prabowo. Wiranto really doesn’t 
contribute that much to JK.
On Yudhoyono’s second 
term
So what’s next? The election 
is over, SBY is elected, and I 
think now we need to look at 
how he is going to govern for 
the next five years. A good 
reference for how he will 
govern is looking at how he 
selected his running mate. 
How he selected Boediono 
may reflect how he is going to select his cabinet. 
This was an historic decision that SBY made. He 
selected someone from the same area – they come from 
same district, basically. Yudhoyono and Boediono are 
from the same regency. This is against the conventional 
wisdom that you must include a candidate from outside 
Java, you must also consider political parties, and 
you have to take into account Muslim voters. Those 
[considerations] were basically bypassed. He elected 
someone not based on his background, but based on 
what he could do, what he could deliver. This is very 
different than the past. In 2004, the cabinet reflected 
the political equilibrium at that time. Political parties 
were accommodated to ensure that the cabinet reflected 
the equilibrium of politics.  
When he decided to have Boediono, it showed he was 
looking forward. There were lots of stories about the 
process – rather long and with a lot of politics – but 
that’s normal. What matters at the end of the day is he 
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decided to go with someone [of Boediono’s quality]. 
This is important to note when we are talking about 
the cabinet. Although professionals and people of 
political parties are now split 50-50, we may see more 
professionals. 
Two, he may be thinking about a positive legacy for 
this country. We’re talking about legacy as something 
tangible, and therefore I would not be surprised if he 
focuses on infrastructure. … The infrastructure that 
we have today is all a legacy of Suharto. The highways, 
the roads – we put more asphalt on top of them, but 
we don’t actually build new ones. Everything is the 
legacy of Suharto. So now that this is [Yudhoyono’s] 
second term, he may want to 
think about a positive legacy 
especially in something that is 
tangible.
Three, we must also see him as 
a relatively young figure. He 
will be [64] in 2014 and he is 
elected as president in one of the 
largest countries, a democracy, 
in one of the largest Muslim 
populations, and in Asia. If 
he is successful domestically, 
[his accomplishments] will 
be beyond [those of ] Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir 
Mohamad, who were not democratically elected 
leaders. He could emerge as a global leader, and he 
might have that in mind. 
Therefore the second term is very much about being 
able to deliver on policy and economy for a good 
track record. I think this may be what we are seeing 
and that is good sign. I think by now, SBY is a more 
experienced leader than in 2004. In 2004, he was like 
a newcomer to politics but he is now the single most 
powerful political leader and he will really capitalize 
on that power. So in general, it will be a more positive 
second term.
Fourth, a lot of reform agendas are rather difficult to 
undertake in a first term for any president. … Things 
to empower the executive office or the government are 
rather difficult to do. In the second term, the president 
would have the capacity to send the message, “This is 
not for me. This is for the country because I’m done 
after this term.” He could not deliver that message in 
the first term. In the second term it will be easier to say 
that, and so we may see more reform – especially, I’m 
hoping, electoral reform, because that’s needed.  
On the future of democracy in Indonesia
Finally let me end with discussion of democracy itself. 
This is the third term of democratic government. The 
first was 1999-2004, which was a rather dynamic 
period, and then 2004-2009 and now 2009-2014. This 
is the time in the process of 
democratisation when people 
must feel that democracy is 
better than non-democracy. 
So the challenge that SBY 
and the new DPR (House 
of Representatives) face are 
not only about day-to-day 
politics. It is also the long-
term presence of democracy 
in this third term. This is a 
time when people begin to 
contemplate [the merits of 
democracy]. 
On that, I must note that we are lucky that local 
elections were already complete by the end of 2008. 
Why? Because that is the backbone of a democracy. 
People elected locally must deliver at the local level 
and this ensures that the general public is receiving 
what they expect from the political process. If local 
elections were not there yet, I think this third term 
would be more difficult for the central government to 
undertake.
With that note, I think this is the challenge for the 
third term. We’ll see how the president and the DPR 
will handle it, but we are lucky to have had the local 
elections. I am optimistic that this will create a good 
foundation for long-term democracy in Indonesia.  
“This is the time 
in the process of 
democratisation 
when people must 
feel that democracy 
is better than non-
democracy.”
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